COL8184, Spring Semester 2026
Algorithms for Fair Representation
How to allocate parliamentary seats, select the best movie, and make matches without traveling to heaven.
Instructor: Rohit Vaish ()
Teaching Assistant: Payas Khurana ()
Course Information
What this course is about
This course is about fair allocation of resources---a problem as old as humanity itself. We will focus on three classical problems: apportionment, which deals with fair allocation of parliamentary seats among states; committee selection, which involves choosing a set of alternatives that are broadly acceptable to the electorate, and stable matching, which aims to match two sets of agents in a way that prevents the assignments from unraveling.
The course will take us on a fascinating journey through the history of these problems, demonstrating how concepts from theoretical computer science, economics, and mathematics apply together to address real-world challenges. Along the way, we will enrich our technical toolbox by learning new algorithmic techniques and exploring fixed-point theorems.
Students interested in theoretical computer science and algorithms, as well as their applications in economics and game theory, should find this course relevant.
PrerequisitesThis is a theoretical course that requires mathematical maturity, particularly the ability to understand and write formal mathematical proofs, as well as a background in algorithm design and analysis. The relevant prerequisites at IIT Delhi are COL202/MTL180 (Discrete Mathematical Structures) and COL351/MTL342 (Analysis and Design of Algorithms). There is no requirement for any background in economics. If you have any questions about the prerequisites, please contact Rohit before the start of the course.
Reference texts
- [BY] Michel L. Balinski and H. Peyton Young. Fair Representation: Meeting the Ideal of One Man, One Vote
- [S] George G. Szpiro. Numbers Rule: The Vexing Mathematics of Democracy, from Plato to the Present
Admin
Lecture timings and venueMonday and Thursday 2-3:30 PM, Venue: LH 614.
Announcements will be made on the Microsoft Teams channel.
Thursday 4-5 PM at Bharti 428
Evaluation policyThe evaluation will be based on three assignments (10% each), in-class quizzes (30%), and a research project (40%). Depending on the class size, it may be possible to do the assignments and/or projects in groups. For quizzes, the three worst scores will be dropped.
For the project, you will be expected to read a paper (or a set of closely related papers); a suggestive list is here. The deliverables will include a presentation and a report. There will also be a mid-term project update meeting.
Your final presentation and report should clearly convey the problem studied by the paper(s), the status of prior work, the main contribution of the paper(s) and why you think it is novel and interesting, as well as directions for future research. There will be a significant weightage for new observations and insights, so you are strongly encouraged to present those as well.
Audits are not allowed.
How to registerRaise a "General Request" on eAdmin and email Rohit with information about your prior coursework and relevant research experience.
| Date | Topic | References | |
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| Part I: Apportionment | |||
| Lecture 1 Jan 05 (Mon) |
The Apportionment Problem Introduction to the course and basics of the apportionment problem. |
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| Lecture 2 Jan 08 (Thurs) |
Apportionment Methods and Paradoxes The methods of Hamilton, Jefferson, Adams, and Webster, and the Alabama paradox. |
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| Lecture 3 Jan 12 (Mon) |
Apportionment Paradoxes (Contd.) and Axioms The New State and Population paradoxes, and House and Population Monotonicity. |
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Jan 15 (Thurs) |
No lecture |
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| Lecture 4 Jan 19 (Mon) |
Divisor Methods |
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| Lecture 5 Jan 22 (Thurs) |
An Optimization View of Apportionment + Project Meetings |
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| Lecture 6 Jan 29 (Thurs) |
Balinski-Young Impossibility Result |
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Feb 01 (Sun) |
Assignment 1 (Bharti 501, 9 AM to 1 PM) |
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| Lecture 7 Feb 02 (Mon) |
Assignment 1 Discussion |
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| Lecture 8 Feb 05 (Thurs) |
Circumventing Balinski-Young Impossibility |
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Feb 09 (Mon) |
Project Meetings |
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| Lecture 9 Feb 12 (Thurs) |
Axioms for Randomized Apportionment |
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| Lecture 10 Feb 16 (Mon) |
Bizarre Correlations in Grimmett's Outcomes |
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| Lecture 11 Feb 19 (Thurs) |
The Careful Sliding Method |
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| Lecture 12 Mar 09 (Mon) |
Randomized Apportionment via Network Flows |
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| Lecture 13 Mar 12 (Thurs) |
Mid-Term Project Presentations |
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Mar 14 (Sat) Thursday timetable |
No lecture |
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Mar 16 (Mon) |
No lecture |
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Mar 19 (Thurs) |
No lecture |
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| Tentatively Mar 22 (Sun) |
Assignment 2 (LH318, 9 AM to 1 PM) |
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| Part II: Stable Matching | |||
| Lecture 14 Mar 23 (Mon) |
The Stable Matching Problem Introduction to the course and basics of the stable matching problem. |
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| Lecture 15 Mar 30 (Mon) |
Structure of Stable Matchings The lattice of stable matchings, and the story of consensus and conflict. |
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| Lecture 16 Apr 02 (Thurs) |
Fairness in Stable Matching Problem Using linear programming to find a median stable matching. |
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| Lecture 17 Apr 06 (Mon) |
Many-To-One Stable Matchings Reduction to canonical one-to-one problem, Rural hospitals theorem, and manipulation via capacity modification. |
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| Part III: Committee Selection | |||
| Lecture 18 Apr 09 (Thurs) |
Condorcet Dimension I |
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| Tentatively Apr 12 (Sun) |
Assignment 3 (LH318, 9 AM to 1 PM) |
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| Lecture 19 Apr 13 (Mon) |
Condorcet Dimension II |
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| Lecture 20 Apr 16 (Thurs) |
Condorcet Dimension III |
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| Lecture 21 Apr 20 (Mon) |
Final Project Presentations I |
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| Lecture 22 Apr 23 (Thurs) |
Final Project Presentations II |
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| Project Suggestions |
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| Apportionment |
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| Committee Selection |
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| Stable Matching |
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