

## Lecture 12

# Fair Allocation of Indivisible Chores

# The Model


Set of agents



Set of indivisible items



Allocation



# Valuation Function

For three items  $\textcircled{A}$   $\textcircled{B}$   $\textcircled{C}$

$$\begin{aligned} \triangle \{\} &= 0 & \triangle \{\textcircled{A}\} &= 1 & \triangle \{\textcircled{A} \textcircled{B}\} &= 1 & \triangle \{\textcircled{A} \textcircled{B} \textcircled{C}\} &= 3 \\ \triangle \{\textcircled{B}\} &= 0 & \triangle \{\textcircled{B} \textcircled{C}\} &= 2 \\ \triangle \{\textcircled{C}\} &= 2 & \triangle \{\textcircled{A} \textcircled{C}\} &= 3 \end{aligned}$$



Description grows *exponentially* with the number of items!

# Additive Valuations

$$\triangle \{ \textcircled{A} \textcircled{B} \textcircled{C} \} = \triangle \{ \textcircled{A} \} + \triangle \{ \textcircled{B} \} + \triangle \{ \textcircled{C} \}$$

# Additive Valuations

$$\triangle \{ \textcircled{A} \textcircled{B} \textcircled{C} \} = \triangle \{ \textcircled{A} \} + \triangle \{ \textcircled{B} \} + \triangle \{ \textcircled{C} \}$$

	$\textcircled{A}$	$\textcircled{B}$	$\textcircled{C}$
 My utility is 5	4	1	2
 Mine too!	1	0	5

Description grows *linearly* with the number of items.

# Marginal Value

Marginal value of  $\textcircled{A}$  for  $\triangle$  with respect to  $\{\textcircled{B} \textcircled{C}\}$

$$\triangle \textcircled{A} \mid \{\textcircled{B} \textcircled{C}\} = \triangle \{\textcircled{A} \textcircled{B} \textcircled{C}\} - \triangle \{\textcircled{B} \textcircled{C}\}$$

# Types of Resources

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The item  $\textcircled{A}$  is a **good** for  $\triangle$  if for *all* subsets of items  $S$

$$\triangle \textcircled{A} \mid S \geq 0$$



# Types of Resources

The item  $\textcircled{A}$  is a **good** for  $\triangle$  if for *all* subsets of items  $S$

$$\triangle \textcircled{A} \mid S \geq 0$$

E.g., an extra GB of cloud storage



2GB



5GB



15GB



10GB

# Types of Resources

The item  $\textcircled{B}$  is a **chore** for  $\triangle$  if for *all* subsets of items  $S$

$$\triangle \textcircled{B} \mid S \leq 0$$

E.g., a dish that you forgot to wash



# Types of Resources

Good for one agent, chore for another: **Mixed** items

E.g., service charge in restaurant bills



# Types of Resources

If all items are goods for all agents: **Goods** instance

If all items are chores for all agents: **Chores** instance

Otherwise: **Mixed** instance

# Types of Resources

## Goods



## Chores



## Mixed



# Types of Valuation Functions

Goods



Chores



Mixed



# Types of Valuation Functions

Goods

=

Monotone  $\uparrow$

$\triangle_{\text{smiley}}$  S  $\geq$   $\triangle_{\text{smiley}}$  T

whenever  $S \supseteq T$

Chores



Mixed



# Types of Valuation Functions

Goods

=

Monotone  $\uparrow$

$$\triangle S \geq \triangle T$$

whenever  $S \supseteq T$

Chores

=

Monotone  $\downarrow$

$$\triangle S \leq \triangle T$$

whenever  $S \supseteq T$

Mixed





# Types of Valuation Functions

Goods

=

Monotone  $\uparrow$

$$\triangle S \geq \triangle T$$

whenever  $S \supseteq T$

Chores

=

Monotone  $\downarrow$

$$\triangle S \leq \triangle T$$

whenever  $S \supseteq T$

Mixed

$\cup$

Doubly  
monotone

each agent can  
partition items into  
goods and chores

# Types of Valuation Functions

Monotone  $\uparrow$

Additive  
goods

Chores

=

Monotone  $\downarrow$

$$\triangle S \leq \triangle T$$

whenever  $S \supseteq T$

Mixed

$\cup$

Doubly  
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# Types of Valuation Functions

Monotone  $\uparrow$

Additive  
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Monotone  $\downarrow$

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Mixed

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Doubly  
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# Types of Valuation Functions

Monotone  $\uparrow$

Additive  
goods

Monotone  $\downarrow$

Additive  
chores

Mixed

Doubly monotone

Goods



Chores

Additive mixed



# Types of Valuation Functions

Under additive valuations



## Goods

	(A)	(B)	(C)
	4	1	2
	1	0	5

## Chores

	(A)	(B)	(C)
	-1	0	-2
	-5	-1	-1

## Mixed

	(A)	(B)	(C)
	1	1	-1
	-2	0	-2

# Fairness Notions

# Envy-Freeness

[Gamow and Stern, 1958; Foley, 1967]

Each agent prefers its own bundle over that of any other agent.

	(A)	(B)	(C)
My bundle is the best	4	1	2
My bundle is the best	1	1	5



Not guaranteed to exist (two agents, one good)



Checking whether an EF allocation exists is NP-complete

# Envy-Freeness Up To One Good

[Budish, 2011]

Envy can be eliminated by removing some good in the envied bundle.

	(A)	(B)	(C)
My bundle is better if (A) is removed	4	1	2
My bundle is better if (C) is removed	1	1	5



Guaranteed to exist and efficiently computable



# Envy-Freeness Up To One Chore

[Aziz, Caragiannis, Igarashi, and Walsh; *IJCAI* 2019; *JAAMAS* 2022]

Eliminate envy by removing some chore in the envious agent's bundle.

	Ⓐ	Ⓑ	Ⓒ
My bundle is better if Ⓒ is removed	-1	-1	-3
My bundle is better if Ⓐ is removed	-4	-1	-2

Allocation  $A = (A_1, \dots, A_n)$  is EF1 if for every pair of agents  $i, k$ , there exists a chore  $j \in A_i$  such that  $v_i(A_i \setminus \{j\}) \geq v_i(A_k)$ .

# Envy-Freeness Up To One Item

[Aziz, Caragiannis, Igarashi, and Walsh; *IJCAI* 2019; *JAAMAS* 2022]

Eliminate envy by removing some "good" in the envied bundle or some "chore" in the envious agent's bundle.

	(A)	(B)	(C)
My bundle is better if (A) is removed	3	-1	-1
My bundle is better if (A) is removed	-4	1	-2

Allocation  $A = (A_1, \dots, A_n)$  is EF1 if for every pair of agents  $i, k$ , there exists an item  $j \in A_i \cup A_k$  s.t.  $v_i(A_i \setminus \{j\}) \geq v_i(A_k \setminus \{j\})$ .

# The Story of EF1

Monotone  $\uparrow$

Additive  
goods

Monotone  $\downarrow$

Additive  
chores

Mixed

Doubly monotone

Goods

Chores

Additive mixed

# The Story of EF1

Monotone 

Additive  
goods

Monotone 

Additive  
chores

Mixed

Doubly monotone

Goods

Chores

Additive mixed

# The Story of EF1

**Monotone** ↑  
*Envy-cycle elimination*

**Additive  
goods**

*Round-robin*

**Monotone** ↓

**Additive  
chores**

**Mixed**

Doubly monotone

Goods

Chores

Additive mixed

# The Story of EF1

Monotone ↑  
*Envy-cycle elimination*

Additive  
goods  
*Round-robin*

Monotone ↓

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Doubly monotone

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Monotone ↓

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# The Story of EF1

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Additive  
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Monotone ↓

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# Envy-Freeness Up To One Chore

[Aziz, Caragiannis, Igarashi, and Walsh; *IJCAI* 2019; *JAAMAS* 2022]




Eliminate envy by removing some chore in the envious agent's bundle.

	Ⓐ	Ⓑ	Ⓒ
My bundle is better if Ⓒ is removed	-1	-1	-3
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Allocation  $A = (A_1, \dots, A_n)$  is EF1 if for every pair of agents  $i, k$ , there exists a chore  $j \in A_i$  such that  $v_i(A_i \setminus \{j\}) \geq v_i(A_k)$ .

For additive chores, the allocation computed by round-robin algorithm satisfies EF1.




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	(A)	(B)	(C)	(D)	(E)
	-4	-1	-3	-2	-4
	0	-1	-5	-2	-1
	-4	-2	-5	-3	-1




For additive chores, the allocation computed by round-robin algorithm satisfies EF1.

	(A)	(B)	(C)	(D)	(E)
	-4	-1	-3	-2	-4
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	0	-1	-5	-2	-1
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	(A)	(B)	(C)	(D)	(E)
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	0	-1	-5	-2	-1
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	0	-1	-5	-2	-1
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
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
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
If  $r$  precedes  $b$ : Then, by additivity,  $v_r(A_r \setminus \{c\}) \geq v_r(A_b)$ .

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
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
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# The Story of EF1

Monotone ↑

*Envy-cycle elimination*

Additive  
goods

*Round-robin*

Monotone ↓

Additive  
chores

Mixed

Doubly monotone

Goods

Chores

Additive mixed

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Monotone ↓

Additive  
chores  
*Round-robin*

Mixed



# Adapting envy-cycle elimination to chores

While there is an unallocated good

- If the envy graph has a source vertex, assign the good to that agent.
- Otherwise, resolve envy cycles until a source vertex shows up, and then assign the good to it.

# Adapting envy-cycle elimination to chores

While there is an unallocated ~~good~~ chore

- If the envy graph has a ~~source~~ vertex, assign the ~~good~~ to that agent.
- Otherwise, resolve envy cycles until a ~~source~~ vertex shows up, and then assign the ~~good~~ to it.

chore

# Adapting envy-cycle elimination to chores


While there is an unallocated chore

- If the envy graph has a sink vertex, assign the chore to that agent.
- Otherwise, resolve envy cycles until a sink vertex shows up, and then assign the chore to it.

# Adapting envy-cycle elimination to chores

While there is an unallocated chore




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


# Adapting envy-cycle elimination to chores

While there is an unallocated chore

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	(A)	(B)	(C)	(D)	(E)	(F)
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	-2	-1	-2	-2	-3	-1
	-1	-3	-1	-1	-3	-10









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
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# Adapting envy-cycle elimination to chores

While there is an unallocated chore


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


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


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


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


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


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


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# Adapting envy-cycle elimination to chores

While there is an unallocated chore

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The old bundle of  had a "large" chore to offset envy.

New bundle only has "tiny" chores.



-1

-3

-1

-1

-3

-10

C

F


A

D

B

E

Not EF1



# Adapting envy-cycle elimination to chores

While there is an unallocated chore

- If the envy graph has a sink vertex, assign the chore to that agent.
- Otherwise, **resolve envy cycles** until a sink vertex shows up, and then assign the chore to it.

## Source of the problem

Resolving **arbitrary** envy cycles gives us no control over the size of individual chores in the new bundle.



-1


-3

-1

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# Adapting envy-cycle elimination to chores

While there is an unallocated chore

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## Solution

Resolve **top-trading** envy cycle  
Each agent points to its *favorite* envied bundle



-1


-3

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-3

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# Top-trading envy-cycle elimination

[Bhaskar, Sricharan, and Vaish, *APPROX* 2021]

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
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	-2	-1	-2	-2	-3	-1
	-1	-3	-1	-1	-3	-10







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[Bhaskar, Sricharan, and Vaish, *APPROX* 2021]

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
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
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


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$\Rightarrow$  There is a cycle of "most envied" edges

# Top-trading envy-cycle elimination

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**Why does top-trading envy cycle algorithm satisfy EF1?**

Every vertex in the top-trading cycle becomes envy-free.

The problem of "new bundle with tiny chores" does not arise.

[Bhaskar, Sricharan, and Vaish, *APPROX* 2021]

For monotone chores, the allocation computed by the top-trading envy-cycle elimination algorithm satisfies EF1.

# The Story of EF1

Monotone ↑  
*Envy-cycle elimination*

Additive  
goods

*Round-robin*

Monotone ↓

Additive  
chores

*Round-robin*

Mixed

Doubly monotone

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# Envy-Freeness Up To One Item



[Aziz, Caragiannis, Igarashi, and Walsh; *IJCAI* 2019; *JAAMAS* 2022]

Eliminate envy by removing some "good" in the envied bundle or some "chore" in the envious agent's bundle.

	(A)	(B)	(C)
My bundle is better if (A) is removed	3	-1	-1
My bundle is better if (A) is removed	-4	1	-2

Allocation  $A = (A_1, \dots, A_n)$  is EF1 if for every pair of agents  $i, k$ , there exists an item  $j \in A_i \cup A_k$  s.t.  $v_i(A_i \setminus \{j\}) \geq v_i(A_k \setminus \{j\})$ .

For goods+chores, naive round-robin fails EF1.

	(A)	(B)
	1	-1
	1	-1



# Double round-robin algorithm

[Aziz, Caragiannis, Igarashi, and Walsh; *IJCAI* 2019; *JAAMAS* 2022]

# Double round-robin algorithm

[Aziz, Caragiannis, Igarashi, and Walsh; *IJCAI* 2019; *JAAMAS* 2022]




Partition the items into two sets: **positive** and **negative**

**Positive**: items with strictly positive value for at least one agent  
(considered to be a "good" by at least one agent)

**Negative**: all other items  
(considered a "chore" by all agents)




# Double round-robin algorithm

[Aziz, Caragiannis, Igarashi, and Walsh; *IJCAI* 2019; *JAAMAS* 2022]

	(A)	(B)	(C)	(D)	(E)
	-4	-1	-2	2	-4
	0	-1	-5	-2	-1
	-4	-2	-5	0	2

# Double round-robin algorithm

[Aziz, Caragiannis, Igarashi, and Walsh; *IJCAI* 2019; *JAAMAS* 2022]

	-	-	-	+	+
	(A)	(B)	(C)	(D)	(E)
	-4	-1	-2	2	-4
	0	-1	-5	-2	-1
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allocate **negative** items in this order



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allocate **negative** items in this order



and **positive** items in the opposite order

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No. of negative items  
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Picking with skipping

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	0	-1	-5	-2	-1
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[Aziz, Caragiannis, Igarashi, and Walsh; *IJCAI* 2019; *JAAMAS* 2022]

	-	-	-	+	+
	(A)	(B)	(C)	(D)	(E)
↓	-4	-1	-2	2	-4
	0	-1	-5	-2	-1
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[Aziz, Caragiannis, Igarashi, and Walsh; *IJCAI* 2019; *JAAMAS* 2022]

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	(A)	(B)	(C)	(D)	(E)
↓	-4	-1	-2	2	-4
	0	-1	-5	-2	-1
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	(A)	(B)	(C)	(D)	(E)
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		-	-	-	+	+	
		Ⓐ	Ⓑ	Ⓒ	Ⓓ	Ⓔ	
↑		-4	-1	-2	2	-4	
		0	-1	-5	-2	-1	(skip)
		-4	-2	-5	0	2	

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		-	-	-	+	+	
		Ⓐ	Ⓑ	Ⓒ	Ⓓ	Ⓔ	
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Why does double round-robin algorithm satisfy EF1?

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Fix a pair of agents  $(r, b)$ . Analyze envy of  $r$  towards  $b$ .


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
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
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
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...  $b$  ...  $r$  ...

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
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
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# The Story of EF1

Monotone ↑

*Envy-cycle elimination*

Additive  
goods

*Round-robin*

Monotone ↓

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Additive  
chores

*Round-robin*

Mixed

Doubly monotone

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**Additive mixed**  
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# Doubly Monotone Valuations



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Each agent can partition the items into "goods" and "chores".

marginal  $\geq 0$




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Each agent can partition the items into "goods" and "chores".

marginal  $\geq 0$

marginal  $\leq 0$

	(A)	(B)	(C)	(D)	(E)
	-	-	-	+	+
	-	+	+	+	+
	-	+	-	+	-

# EF1 for Doubly Monotone Valuations

Partition the items into two sets: **positive** and **negative**

**Positive**: items considered "good" by at least one agent

**Negative**: items considered "chore" by everyone

# EF1 for Doubly Monotone Valuations

- Assign **positive** items via envy-cycle elimination (envy graph defined w.r.t. agents who consider the item a "good")
- Assign **negative** items via top-trading envy-cycle elimination

[Bhaskar, Sricharan, and Vaish, *APPROX* 2021]

For doubly monotone items, the above algorithm returns an EF1 allocation.

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# Next Time

Fair Rent Division



# Quiz

# Quiz

Prove or disprove:

For  $n$  identical agents with additive valuations over mixed items, an EFX allocation always exists.

# References

- Double round-robin algorithm

Haris Aziz, Ioannis Caragiannis, Ayumi Igarashi and Toby Walsh  
*“Fair allocation of indivisible goods and chores”*

Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 36(3), 2022 pg 1-21

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- Top-trading envy-cycle elimination

Umang Bhaskar, A R Sricharan, and Rohit Vaish

*“On approximate envy-freeness for indivisible chores and mixed resources”*

APPROX 2021

<https://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2021/14694/>

