
COL866: Special Topics in Algorithms

Lecture 8


Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods






















































1 0 5



1 1 5 1 1

Additive valuations


$$\bigcirc$$
























$$= 0+1+1=2$$
















Each agent prefers its own bundle over that of any other agent.



Allocation $A = (A_1, A_2, ..., A_n)$ is EF if for every pair of agents i, k, we have $v_i(A_i) \ge v_i(A_k)$.

Each agent prefers its own bundle over that of any other agent.




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Not guaranteed to exist (two agents, one good)

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Allocation $A = (A_1, A_2, ..., A_n)$ is EF if for every pair of agents i, k, we have $v_i(A_i) \ge v_i(A_k)$.

- Not guaranteed to exist (two agents, one good)
- Checking whether an EF allocation exists is NP-complete




Envy-Freeness Up To One Good [Budish, 2


Envy-Freeness Up To One Good [Budish, 2011]







Envy-Freeness Up To One Good [Budish, 2011]










Envy can be eliminated by removing some good in the envied bundle.



Allocation $A = (A_1, ..., A_n)$ is EF1 if for every pair of agents i, k, there exists a good $j \in A_k$ such that $v_i(A_i) \ge v_i(A_k \setminus \{j\})$.

Envy can be eliminated by removing some good in the envied bundle.

My bundle is better if A is removed

A B C

My bundle is better if C is removed

1 1 5


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


Guaranteed to exist and efficiently computable

Coming Up

Algorithms for finding an EF1 allocation







• Fix an ordering of the agents, say a_1 , a_2 , a_3 , ..., a_n .

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- Agents take turns according to the ordering $(a_1, a_2, ..., a_n, a_1, a_2, ..., a_n, ...)$ to pick their favorite item from the set of remaining items.


- Fix an ordering of the agents, say a_1 , a_2 , a_3 , ..., a_n .
- Agents take turns according to the ordering (a₁, a₂, ..., a_n, a₁, a₂, ..., a_n,...)
 to pick their favorite item from the set of remaining items.




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
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


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 to pick their favorite item from the set of remaining items.



Round-robin algorithm

- Fix an ordering of the agents, say a_1 , a_2 , a_3 , ..., a_n .
- Agents take turns according to the ordering (a₁, a₂, ..., a_n, a₁, a₂, ..., a_n,...)
 to pick their favorite item from the set of remaining items.



 $\mathbf{a_1} \quad \mathbf{a_2} \quad \mathbf{a_3} \quad \cdots \quad \mathbf{a_n}$

 $\mathbf{a_1} \quad \mathbf{a_2} \quad \mathbf{a_3} \quad \cdots \quad \mathbf{a_n}$

First round

 $\mathbf{a_1} \quad \mathbf{a_2} \quad \mathbf{a_3} \quad \cdots \quad \mathbf{a_n}$

First round •

 $\mathbf{a_1} \quad \mathbf{a_2} \quad \mathbf{a_3} \quad \cdots \quad \mathbf{a_n}$

First round • •

 $\mathbf{a_1} \quad \mathbf{a_2} \quad \mathbf{a_3} \quad \cdots \quad \mathbf{a_n}$

First round • • •

 $\mathbf{a_1} \quad \mathbf{a_2} \quad \mathbf{a_3} \quad \cdots \quad \mathbf{a_n}$

First round • • • · · ·

 $\mathbf{a_1}$ $\mathbf{a_2}$ $\mathbf{a_3}$ \cdots $\mathbf{a_n}$

First round • • • • • • •

 $\mathbf{a_1}$ $\mathbf{a_2}$ $\mathbf{a_3}$ \cdots $\mathbf{a_n}$

First round • • • • • •

Second round

 $\mathbf{a_1} \quad \mathbf{a_2} \quad \mathbf{a_3} \quad \cdots \quad \mathbf{a_n}$

First round • • • • • • •

Second round •

 $\mathbf{a_1} \quad \mathbf{a_2} \quad \mathbf{a_3} \quad \cdots \quad \mathbf{a_n}$

First round • • • • • • •

Second round • •

 $\mathbf{a_1} \quad \mathbf{a_2} \quad \mathbf{a_3} \quad \cdots \quad \mathbf{a_n}$

First round • • • • • • •

Second round • • •


 $\mathbf{a_1}$ $\mathbf{a_2}$ $\mathbf{a_3}$ \cdots $\mathbf{a_n}$


First round • • • • • • •


Second round • • • · · ·




- First round • • • •
- Second round • • •











Fix a pair of agents (r,b). Analyze envy of r towards b.

First round Second round · · · • · · · • · · · Third round Last round





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
If r precedes b: Then, by additivity, $v_r(A_r) \ge v_r(A_b)$.

```
First round
Second round · · · • • · · · • · · ·
Third round
 Last round
```






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


If b precedes r: Again, by additivity, $v_r(A_r) \ge v_r(A_b \setminus \{g\})$.

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


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


- Vertices = agents
- Edge from vertex i to vertex k if agent i envies agent k in the given allocation.


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


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



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



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
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




Envy graph of an allocation

- Vertices = agents
- Edge from vertex i to vertex k if agent i envies agent k in the given allocation.





[Lipton, Markakis, Mossel, and Saberi, EC 2004]

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While there is an unallocated good

• If the envy graph has a source vertex, assign the good to that agent.

[Lipton, Markakis, Mossel, and Saberi, EC 2004]

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- Otherwise, resolve envy cycles until a source vertex shows up, and then assign the good to it.

[Lipton, Markakis, Mossel, and Saberi, EC 2004]


While there is an unallocated good

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each agent in the cycle gets the bundle that it is pointing to


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







[Lipton, Markakis, Mossel, and Saberi, EC 2004]


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




[Lipton, Markakis, Mossel, and Saberi, EC 2004]


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




[Lipton, Markakis, Mossel, and Saberi, EC 2004]


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




[Lipton, Markakis, Mossel, and Saberi, EC 2004]


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




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
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




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
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




[Lipton, Markakis, Mossel, and Saberi, EC 2004]


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




[Lipton, Markakis, Mossel, and Saberi, EC 2004]


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
- With n agents, at most O(n²) cycle resolutions required to create a source.
- Polynomial running time!






























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
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






After resolving any envy cycle, the total number of edges in the envy graph strictly decreases.




these edges can either stay or disappear (no new such edges are added)









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
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
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Allocation A is EF1 if for every pair of agents i, k, there exists a good $j \in A_k$ such that $v_i(A_i) \geq v_i(A_k \setminus \{j\})$.

We will argue that each iteration of the algorithm "preserves" EF1.

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If the partial allocation at the beginning of an iteration is EF1, then the partial allocation at the end of that iteration is also EF1.

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Suppose good g is assigned to the source agent s. Then,

$$v_i(A_i) \ge v_i(A_s \cup \{g\} \setminus \{g\})$$

which means that EF1 is preserved.

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
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
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


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
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From their perspective, the bundles in the cycle are only shifted around. So, EF1 relations are the same as before.



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
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
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These agents are strictly better off, and any envied bundles are only shifted around. So, again, EF1 is maintained.




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Next Time

Fairness and Efficiency



References

Envy-cycle elimination algorithm

Richard Lipton, Evangelos Markakis, Elchanan Mossel, and Amin Saberi "On Approximately Fair Allocations of Indivisible Goods" EC 2004, pg 125-131

https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/988772.988792