COMPUTATIONAL CHALLENGES IN DATA PRIVACY

DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY

JULY 05, 2025 | ROHIT VAISH

MAP 1.



C. F. Cheffins, Lith, Southampton Bldgs. London.

SCALE 30 INCHES TO A MILE.



MAP 1.
OXFORD STREET
REGENT CIRCUS
REGENT STREET
MARGARET STREET
PRINCES STREET
JOHN STREET
GT. CASTLE ST
CASTLE ST EAST
OXFORD MARKET
MARKET ROW
WELLS STREET
BERNERS STREET
NEWMAN STREET
RATHBONE PLACE
CHARLES ST
SOHO SQUARE
FRITH STREET
GREEK STREET
DEAN STREET
CARLISLE ST
CRAWFORD STREET
SUTTON STS
CHAPEL ST
WARDOUR STREET
BERWICK STREET
NOEL STREET
HOLLEN STREET
LITTLE CHAPEL STREET
POLAND STREET
PORTLAND STREET
PORTLAND MEWS
BENTINCK STREET
WORK HOUSE
MARLBOROUGH MEWS
BLENHEIM MEWS
BLENHEIM STREET
GREAT MARLBOROUGH STREET
ARGYLL STREET
LITTLE ARGYLL ST
ARGYLL PLACE
HANOVER SQUARE
HANOVER STREET
PRINCES STREET
GEORGE STREET
MADDOX STREET
MILL STREET
CONDUIT STREET
NEW BOND STREET
BRUTON ST
GRAFTON STREET
DOVER STREET
ALBEMARLE STREET
OLD BURLINGTON STREET
BURLINGTON GARDENS
CLIFFORD STREET
CORK STREET
SAVILLE ROW
NEW BURLINGTON STREET
BOYLE ST
HEDDON COURT
HEDDON STREET
REGENT STREET
KING STREET
CARNABY STREET
MARSHALL STREET
BROAD STREET
CAMBRIDGE STREET
SILVER STREET
GOLDEN SQUARE
BRIDLE STREET
GREAT PULTENEY STREET
LITTLE WINDMILL STREET
LITTLE PULTENEY STREET
BREWER STREET
WARWICK STREET
BEAK ST
SHERRARD STREET
WINDMILL STREET
ARCHER STREET
QUEEN STREET
RUPERT STREET
RICHMOND ST
RICHMOND BUILDINGS
PETER STREET
EDWARD STREET
OLD COMPTON STREET
CHURCH ST
KING ST
QUEEN STREET
PRINCES STREET
GERRARD ST
LISLE STREET
LEICESTER STREET
MACCLESFIELD ST
NEWPORT MARKET
TICHBORNE STREET
COVENTRY STREET
MARYLEBONE STREET
GLASSHOUSE ST
VIGO STREET
REGENTS QUADRANT
AIR STREET
VINE STREET
SWALLOW STREET
SACKVILLE STREET
ALBANY
PICCADILLY
REGENT CIRCUS
HAYMARKET
JERMYN STREET
ORANDON STREET
PANTON STREET
PUMP
PUMP
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C.F. Cheffins, Lith, Southampton Bdgs. London.
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


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





Using private data
for public good

Massachusetts, USA

Massachusetts, USA

William Weld

1997: Governor Weld approved release of state employee health records post-anonymization

Massachusetts, USA

William Weld

1997: Governor Weld approved release of state employee health records post-anonymization

Latanya Sweeney

Massachusetts, USA

William Weld

1997: Governor Weld approved release of state employee health records
post-anonymization

Latanya Sweeney

Massachusetts, USA

William Weld

Few days later: Sweeney mailed Weld his medical records. 😐


Ethnicity
Visit date
Diagnosis
Procedure
Medication
Total charge
ZIP
Birth date
Sex
Name
Address
Date registered
Party affiliation
Date last voted
Medical Data
Voter List



87% Americans can be identified uniquely


LONG LIVE THE REVOLUTION. OUR NEXT MEETING WILL BE AT THE DOCKS AT MIDNIGHT ON JUNE 28
TAB
AHA, FOUND THEM!

WHEN YOU TRAIN PREDICTIVE MODELS ON INPUT FROM YOUR USERS, IT CAN LEAK INFORMATION IN UNEXPECTED WAYS.

ANONYMIZATION ≠ PRIVACY

ANONYMIZATION ≠ PRIVACY

ANONYMIZATION ≠ PRIVACY

$1M prize to improve upon Netflix's recommendation algo by 10%.

Dataset : 100 M ratings , 480 k users , 17 k movies

NETFLIX
2009
DATE 09·21·09
PAY TO THE ORDER OF BellKor's Pragmatic Chaos
$ 1,000,000 00
AMOUNT: ONE MILLION 00/100
FOR The Netflix Prize
Reed Hastings



Computer Science > Cryptography and Security

[Submitted on 18 Oct 2006 (v1), last revised 22 Nov 2007 (this version, v2)]

How To Break Anonymity of the Netflix Prize Dataset

Arvind Narayanan, Vitaly Shmatikov

We present a new class of statistical de-anonymization attacks against high-dimensional micro-data, such as individual preferences, recommendations, transaction records and so on. Our techniques are robust to perturbation in the data and tolerate some mistakes in the adversary's background knowledge.

We apply our de-anonymization methodology to the Netflix Prize dataset, which contains anonymous movie ratings of 500,000 subscribers of Netflix, the world's largest online movie rental service. We demonstrate that an adversary who knows only a little bit about an individual subscriber can easily identify this subscriber's record in the dataset. Using the Internet Movie Database as the source of background knowledge, we successfully identified the Netflix records of known users, uncovering their apparent political preferences and other potentially sensitive information.

Subjects: **Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)**; Databases (cs.DB)



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Netflix data + IMDb data ⟶ Possible to learn

("anonymized") (non-anonymous) sensitive, non-public info


arXiv > cs > arXiv:cs/0610105
Search...
Help | Adv
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Netflix data ("anonymized") + IMDb data (non-anonymous) → Possible to learn sensitive, non-public info

Voluntarily posted public info about some of one's liked/disliked movies on IMDb → All ratings privately entered into Netflix


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Netflix data ("anonymized") + IMDb data (non-anonymous) → Possible to learn sensitive, non-public info

Linkage attack

Voluntarily posted public info about some of one's liked/disliked movies on IMDb → All ratings privately entered into Netflix

- - - many other examples!

* Membership inference in genomic studies
[Homer et al., 2008]

* Memorization in neural networks
[Carlini et al., 2021]

ANONYMIZED DATA ISN'T

PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY

PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY

Survey : Do you smoke ?

PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY

Survey : Do you smoke ?

Want to determine # smokers without violating privacy.

PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY

Survey : Do you smoke ?

Want to determine # smokers without violating privacy.

Perfect privacy : Everyone reports NO

PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY

Survey : Do you smoke ?

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Perfect privacy : Everyone reports NO   not useful ☹

PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY

Survey : Do you smoke ?

Want to determine # smokers without violating privacy.

Perfect privacy : Everyone reports NO   not useful ☹

Any other way ?

PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY

Survey : Do you smoke ?

A participant flips a fair coin.

PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY

Survey: Do you smoke?

A participant flips a fair coin.



Tails

Heads

PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY

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

Tails

Heads

Respond truthfully

PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY

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

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

Tails

Respond truthfully

Heads

flip another fair coin

Tails

Respond NO

Heads

Respond YES

PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY

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

Tails

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flip another fair coin

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Respond NO

Heads

Respond YES

Privacy

PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY

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

Tails

Respond truthfully

Heads

flip another fair coin

Tails

Respond NO

Heads

Respond YES

Privacy

Probability of responding YES is at least $\frac{1}{4}$ regardless of whether the participant actually smokes.

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

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Can "pretend" to be an actual non-smoker

PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY

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

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Accuracy

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

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Accuracy

n participants

p fraction are actual smokers

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

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$\mathbb{E}[\#\text{ YES in survey}] =$

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

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Accuracy

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p fraction are actual smokers

$$\mathbb{E}[\#\text{ YES in survey}] =$$

$$np \cdot \left(\frac{3}{4}\right) + n(1-p) \cdot \frac{1}{4}$$

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A participant flips a fair coin.



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$$np \cdot \left(\frac{3}{4}\right) + n(1-p) \cdot \frac{1}{4}$$

$$= \frac{n}{4} + \frac{np}{2}.$$

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
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Heads

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Accuracy

n participants

p fraction are actual smokers

$$\mathbb{E}\left[\#\text{ YES in survey}\right] =$$

$$np \cdot \left(\frac{3}{4}\right) + n(1-p) \cdot \frac{1}{4}$$

$$= \frac{n}{4} + \frac{np}{2}.$$

Can determine p without violating individual privacy

DEFINING PRIVACY

DEFINING PRIVACY

Privacy is NOT a property of the published data

It is a property of the mechanism used to publish the data

DEFINING PRIVACY



DEFINING PRIVACY



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

Analyst cannot tell which universe they are in.

DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY

[Dwork, McSherry, Nissim, Smith TCC 2006]

DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY

[Dwork, McSherry, Nissim, Smith TCC 2006]

Dataset



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

DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY

[Dwork, McSherry, Nissim, Smith TCC 2006]



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

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

An algorithm is differentially private if its distribution over outputs does not change much after adding/removing one point.

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

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

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

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

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User can plausibly deny its presence ("smoking" survey example)

Protects user from any additional harm due to its participation.

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"almost indistinguishable"

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* δ : probability of total privacy failure

  ↪ helps with "rare events"

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* Would have been inferred, whether or not this person participated.

How to make algorithms differentially private?

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two-sided exponential distribution



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

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

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Exercise : Prove that $f(x) + Z$ is $(\varepsilon, 0)$-DP.

APPLICATIONS

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

Privatizing histograms

APPLICATIONS



Adoption of differential privacy in real-world applications [edit]

See also: Implementations of differentially private analyses

To date there are over 12 real-world deployments of differential privacy, the most noteworthy being:

- 2008: U.S. Census Bureau, for showing commuting patterns.[21]
- 2014: Google's RAPPOR, for telemetry such as learning statistics about unwanted software hijacking users' settings.[22][23]
- 2015: Google, for sharing historical traffic statistics.[24]
- 2016: Apple iOS 10, for use in Intelligent personal assistant technology.[25]
- 2017: Microsoft, for telemetry in Windows.[26]
- 2020: Social Science One and Facebook, a 55 trillion cell dataset for researchers to learn about elections and democracy.[27][28]
- 2021: The US Census Bureau uses differential privacy to release redistricting data from the 2020 Census.[29]

FIND OUT MORE AT



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9:3-4

The Algorithmic Foundations of Differential Privacy

Cynthia Dwork and Aaron Roth

now
the essence of knowledge

http://www.gautamkamath.com/CS860-fa2020.html

Course by Gautam Kamath